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Restructuring sovereign debt has long proved challenging: There is no formal regime for 
sovereign insolvencies similar to those that that govern domestic bankruptcy and insolvency 
and attempts to create one by international treaty have been met with political resistance. 
Currently, sovereign debt restructuring is governed by the debt contracts themselves along 
with the background law in the jurisdiction in which the debt is issued. Sovereign immunity 
also protects most state assets from seizure. These ad hoc restructuring processes are 
plagued by unpredictability, however, and there are incentives for individual creditors to 
“hold out,” demanding full repayment of their claims and thereby undermining a necessary 
restructuring. Judicial decisions in recent years regarding debt governed by New York law 
have only strengthened the hand of these holdout creditors. While modifications to standard 
terms in sovereign debt contracts can go some way towards improving the current situation, 
this paper proposes that a superior option is the adoption of a Model Law on sovereign 
debt restructuring by at least one appropriate jurisdiction. Under the Model Law approach, 
sovereigns could issue debt in a jurisdiction that has enacted a law providing for a fair, orderly, 
and predictable restructuring in the event that a sovereign’s debt becomes unsustainable. 
Due to its well-developed financial markets and reputation for the rule of law, this paper 
argues that Ontario, supported by Canada, would be an appropriate jurisdiction to enact such 
a law. This article further argues that a collaborative legislative approach between Ontario 
and federal Parliament would best ensure the constitutional validity, and therefore stability, 
of this novel and innovative proposed regime. 
IN RECENT DECADES, SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES—most recently in Greece and 
Argentina, and now in Venezuela—have spurred both controversy and interest. 
The world of sovereign debt is deeply dysfunctional. Countries in unsustainable 
financial situations may be unable to pay, but there is no systematic way to resolve 
their positions. The result is seemingly endless litigation, with most creditors 
ready to agree to an equitable resolution while a few holdout creditors are able to 
manipulate the system to obtain an unfair advantage.
Sovereign insolvencies differ from domestic insolvencies in that the latter are 
almost universally regulated by legislation; when an individual or company faces 
an inability to pay its debts, statutes across jurisdictions regulate the behaviour of 
both the debtor and the debtor’s creditors. Statutes typically provide a framework 
for negotiating a compromise on unsustainable debt, and as a last resort allow for 
the winding up of a corporation or a bankruptcy and fresh start for individual 
debtors. No comparable regime exists for sovereigns; sovereigns cannot declare 
bankruptcy, as there is no regime in which they may do so, and thus are incapable 
of ever obtaining the legalized fresh start that follows bankruptcy for individual 
debtors.1 There is furthermore no existing formalized regime under which 
sovereigns and their creditors can negotiate restructuring agreements. All that is 
available to sovereigns at present is the option to negotiate with their creditors 
1. For obvious reasons, sovereigns cannot be liquidated and wound up like corporations.
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individually2 and the ability to rely upon the institution of sovereign immunity, 
which protects state assets from seizure when and if they default on their loans. 
The status quo, however, allows for opportunistic behaviour by holdout creditors 
who refuse to restructure their claims and then seek to benefit from other 
creditors’ concessions by demanding the payment of their own claims in full.
The recent Argentinian sovereign debt crisis dramatically illustrates the 
dysfunctional nature of the current sovereign restructuring problem. While the 
vast majority of Argentina’s creditors accepted a compromise, a few—primarily 
hedge funds specializing in the trade of distressed debt on secondary markets—
did not. The course of litigation in American courts, ending with a refusal of the 
US Supreme Court to hear an appeal from New York Federal Court decisions, 
was a significant win for the holdout creditors.3 Those rulings, discussed in 
greater detail below, found that Argentina was in violation of the pari passu (equal 
ranking) clause in its US dollar-denominated bonds that were governed by New 
York law, and banned the sovereign from making payments on its restructured 
bonds unless it paid holdout creditors in full.4 This ruling relied on a novel 
interpretation of the pari passu clause, which historically had been understood to 
prohibit legal subordination of claims but not to require ratable payments, and 
also took the unusual step of issuing injunctive relief against third parties.5
The effect of the legal action and the combined rulings meant that Argentina 
lost a long legal battle of more than a decade and was forced to pay the holdout 
creditors 2.426 billion USD. This protracted and dramatic ordeal demonstrated 
how a small group of creditors can successfully extract preferential treatment and 
cause severe disruption for everyone else—other creditors as well as the sovereign 
debtor. Most commentators regard this development as decisively tilting the 
delicate balance between debtors and creditors, giving individual creditors 
2. Anna Gelpern notes, however, that in practice, this informal restructuring process “is 
dominated by a small group of repeat players” who form a “tight community with 
considerable norm-generating capacity,” and that a degree of coordination therefore occurs 
even in the absence of a formalized regime. See Anna Gelpern, “A Skeptic’s Case for 
Sovereign Bankruptcy” (2013) 50 Hous L Rev 1095 at 1106.
3. Republic of Argentina v NML Capital, Ltd, 573 US 134 (2014); NML Capital, Ltd v Republic 
of Argentina, 727 F (3d) 230 (2d Cir 2013); NML Capital, Ltd v Republic of Argentina, 699 F 
(3d) 246 (2d Cir 2012) [NML Capital v Argentina, 2012].
4. Ibid.
5. For a discussion of the novelty of the injunctive remedy given in this case, see Mark C. 
Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, “Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation” (2014) 31:1 
Yale J on Reg 189. 
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incentives to refuse restructuring agreements and thereby making mutually 
beneficial settlements harder to achieve.6
Attempts to remedy the dysfunctional status quo have thus far generally 
fallen within two broad approaches: (1) the proposal of a treaty on sovereign 
debt restructuring, or the “treaty approach,” and (2) the insertion of certain 
contractual provisions into the debt instruments themselves, known as the 
“contractual approach.”
The first approach is an attempt to replicate some features of domestic 
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation for sovereigns via an international treaty. 
However, the prospects for establishing such a regime are bleak. The only fully 
thought-through true sovereign bankruptcy regime initiative, the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in the early 2000s,7 remains politically infeasible.
Meanwhile, the contractual approach has had limited success. Contractual 
reforms have included clarifying pari passu repayment terms in order to avoid 
the outcome seen in the Argentina litigation and, perhaps most importantly, the 
insertion of collective action clauses (CACs) that seek to limit holdout behaviour 
by aggregating creditors’ restructuring decisions in supermajority voting 
provisions. While these reforms are welcome, they have thus far been less than 
fully successful. Currently, a substantial stock of sovereign bonds lacks robust 
aggregate voting mechanisms, and not all new sovereign bond issuances contain 
the enhanced contractual provisions designed to prevent holdout litigation.
Moreover, the contractual approach has inherent limitations that prevent 
it from providing a complete resolution to the problem of sovereign debt. For 
instance, CACs only apply to bonds, and cannot apply to syndicated or bilateral 
loans, meaning the threat of holdout creditors will continue in sovereign debt 
restructuring even as CACs become increasingly widely adopted. Illustratively, 
6. See e.g. Martin Guzman & Joseph E Stiglitz, “How Hedge Funds Held Argentina for 
Ransom,” New York Times (1 April 2016), online: <www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/opinion/
how-hedge-funds-held-argentina-for-ransom.html> [perma.cc/VN4C-VSFZ]; Jack Jrada, 
“Closing the Book on Argentina’s Sovereign Debt Default: The Second Circuit’s Decision 
and its Ramifications for Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone” (2013) 32 Rev 
Banking & Fin L 222 at 222, 232; Brett Neve, “NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina: 
An Alternative to the Inadequate Remedies under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” 
(2014) 39 NCJ Intl L & Com Reg 631 at 657–60.
7. See International Monetary Fund, Report of the Managing Director to the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee on a Statutory Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(Washington, DC: IMF, 8 April 2003). For a detailed legal analysis of the SDRM proposal, 
see Sean Hagan, “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt” (2005) 36 
Geo J Intl L 299 at 33590.
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CACs did not operate to prevent holdout creditors from building blocking 
positions in the recent Greek debt crisis despite their existence in most Greek 
debt instruments.8 Additionally, the interpretation of pari passu clauses across 
jurisdictions remains inconsistent and unclear, even though new modified clauses 
help address this uncertainty.
The two dominant approaches under consideration therefore, each in 
their own way, appear inadequate to resolving the problem of sovereign debt.9 
However, between these two approaches there lies a third option: A Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Model Law (“Model Law”) adopted by a legislature in at 
least one jurisdiction designed to facilitate a rapid, orderly, and collaborative 
debt restructuring agreement between a sovereign debtor and its creditors. The 
Model Law approach shares similar objectives with the IMF’s proposed SDRM 
but proposes to achieve it by means of national or subnational legislation that 
sovereigns and their creditors can contractually opt into, rather than by means of a 
binding international agreement. This paper argues that the Model Law approach 
retains the primary advantages of both the treaty and contractual approaches, 
without being hindered by some of their principal limitations. This article further 
suggests that the Province of Ontario, supported by the government of Canada, 
is well-positioned to take the lead in adopting this approach. Not only would 
Ontario demonstrate leadership in resolving a pressing international issue and 
enhance the rule of law and fairness in sovereign debt restructurings, adopting the 
8. See Part II, below, for a discussion.
9. Regarding the dominance of these two approaches, the International Law Association (ILA) 
has been studying the problem of sovereign debt since 2007, and has focused primarily on 
the treaty approach and the contractual approach as the two available solutions. For instance, 
in 2014 the ILA’s Sovereign Bankruptcy Study Group held a moot court to debate these 
two approaches. See Sovereign Insolvency Study Group, “State Insolvency: Options for the 
Way Forward” (Paper delivered at the International Law Association Conference at The 
Hague, August 2010), (2010) 74 Intl L Assoc Reports Conferences 978; See also “Study 
Groups,” online: International Law Association <www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups> 
[perma.cc/3V2M-9DAG].
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Model Law would also lead to local benefits by significantly advancing Toronto’s 
position as a world-class financial jurisdiction.10
The article proceeds as follows. First, the article considers the negative 
consequences of the absence of a legal framework to deal with unsustainable 
sovereign debt. It revisits historically significant episodes, such as the Greek and 
Argentinian debt crises, in which a small group of creditors successfully insisted 
on preferential treatment and managed to disproportionately benefit from the 
entire restructuring process. Similar circumstances appear to be developing in 
Venezuela, with even more catastrophic consequences. Such holdout actions 
not only have haunted sovereign borrowers and nations reeling under economic 
and social crises but have also undermined the collective economic interests of 
creditors. The article then provides a historical survey of past attempts to create a 
formal restructuring framework at the international level. These attempts range 
as far back as a Mexican proposal to the Pan American Conference in 1933, 
through to the IMF-sponsored SDRM proposal in the early 2000s, and more 
recent attempts in 2014–2015 in the UN General Assembly to move towards a 
multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring. The article illustrates 
how all these proposals seeking to create an international treaty or organization 
to deal with sovereign debt failed to generate sufficient support and hence could 
not move forward. The article then demonstrates that the current contractual 
approach to managing sovereign debt has not sufficiently resolved the issue and 
is unlikely to do so in the future due to inherent limitations of this approach.
The last part of the article focuses on the Model Law as an alternative 
reform initiative that could more effectively address the current sovereign debt 
impasse. The fact that the Model Law can become law and operate with only 
one jurisdiction adopting it—provided that it is the right jurisdiction—would 
make it far less prone to failure than other reform initiatives that have relied 
on concerted multilateral action. Model laws have brought about incremental 
reform in other areas of law, such as international commercial arbitration and 
10. The meaning of the rule of law in the context of sovereign debt restructurings is 
contested. See Oonagh E. Fitzgerald, “The Pursuit of Global Rule of Law for Sovereign 
Debt Restructurings,” Commentary (10 March 2015), online: Centre for International 
Governance Innovation <www.cigionline.org/publications/pursuit-global-rule-law-sovereign-
debt-restructuring> [perma.cc/5HAV-X94P]. While some are of the view that the rule of 
law requires debtor countries to pay all debts in full, we note that no domestic insolvency 
regime requires this of debtors, however strong the rule of law may be in that jurisdiction. 
Instead, we prefer the alternative view discussed by Fitzgerald that ties the concept of 
the rule of law to the clarity and public availability of rules surrounding sovereign debt 
restructuring (ibid at 2).
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cross-border insolvency, which proved contentious for many years. The article 
argues that Canada, and the Province of Ontario in particular, is well-placed to 
take the lead with this initiative, and addresses various constitutional and other 
issues that may arise with respect to the adoption of the Model Law in Canada. 
The article closes with a review of previous reform initiatives in sovereign debt 
and the valuable lessons they can offer on how to succeed with the Model Law.
I. SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES, HOLDOUTS, AND 
DISORDERLY OUTCOMES
Although the Argentinian and Greek debt crises are the most recent 
examples, a number of other costly and destabilizing sovereign crises serve as 
a forceful reminder that the international community lacks a framework for 
resolving sovereign debt in a timely and orderly fashion. Allied Bank International 
v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago is one of the earliest cases that highlighted the 
flaws of the existing regime.11 In 1981, Costa Rica had suspended payment to a 
39-member bank syndicate. A restructuring agreement had been reached with all 
creditors except one, Fidelity Union Trust of New Jersey, which sued through its 
agent, the Allied Bank. The US Second Circuit initially upheld a district court 
ruling in favour of Costa Rica that had held:
Costa Rica’s prohibition of payments of its external debt is analogous to the 
reorganization of a business pursuant to Chapter 11 of our Bankruptcy Code… 
Costa Rica’s prohibition of payment of debt was not a repudiation of the debt 
but rather was merely a deferral of payments while it attempted in good faith to 
renegotiate its obligations.12
However, upon learning that the US government was opposed to the 
restructuring deal, the Second Circuit reversed itself, arguing that while the 
parties could negotiate the terms of payment, “the underlying obligations to pay 
nevertheless remain valid and enforceable.”13 As commentators noted at the time, 
the Allied Bank ruling made it clear that US-style Chapter 11 protections were 
11. Allied Bank International v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F Supp 
1440 (SDNY 1983).
12. Allied Bank International v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F (2d) 23 at 
26 (2d Cir 1984).
13. Allied Bank International v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F (2d) 516 at 519 (2d Cir 
1984) [Allied Bank].
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not available to sovereigns.14 As a result, individual creditors could demand full 
payment of their claims, even though such holding out would further injure 
the financial performance of the debtor sovereign and the collective economic 
interest of creditors.15
The holdout problem resurfaced forcefully in the recent Greek debt crisis. 
The Greek 2012 debt exchange represented the largest debt restructuring in the 
history of sovereign defaults. The program amounted to a €200 billion debt 
exchange and €30 billion debt buyback, allowing for €106 billion in debt relief—
an equivalent of 55 per cent of Greek GDP.16 While the restructuring of Greek 
law-governed bonds was executed relatively quickly and smoothly because of the 
retroactive insertion of CACs, the restructuring of foreign law-governed bonds 
proved to be a daunting challenge.17 Despite the inclusion of CACs in these 
bonds, holdouts managed to build blocking positions in more than half the series, 
which led to a large failure of the restructuring vote. Private creditors holding 
€6.4 billion (about C$10 billion today) in face value refused to exchange the old 
bonds for the new ones and have since been paid their full claims on schedule.18 
The Argentinian debt crisis, as discussed above, provided another clear 
illustration of the dysfunctional nature of the restructuring problem. In June 
2014, the US Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s appeal from the New 
York court decisions in Argentina v NML Capital, Ltd, thereby letting the lower 
courts’ rulings in favour of the holdout creditors stand. The District Court 
held that the pari passu clause prevented Argentina from making payments 
on restructured bonds so long as payments due under bonds held by holdouts 
14. Sidney Dell, “Crisis Management and the International Debt Problem” (1985) 40 Intl J 655 
at 668; Jeffrey D Sachs, “Managing the LDC Debt Crisis” [1986] Brookings Papers on Econ 
Activity 397 at 418.
15. Sachs, supra note 14 at 418.
16. Miranda Xafa, “Sovereign Debt Crisis Management: Lessons from the 2012 Greek Debt 
Restructuring” (2014) Centre for International Governance Innovation Papers Series No 33 
at 5, online: <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/sovereign-debt-crisis-management-
lessons-2012-greek-debt-restructuring>. See also Miranda Xafa, “Greece: Playing with 
Matches in the Ammunition Warehouse” (2017) Centre for International Governance 
Innovation Policy Brief No 100, online: <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/
greece-playing-matches-ammunition-warehouse>.
17. US, Lessons from the IMF Bailout of Greece, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Monetary 
Policy and Trade of the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, 115th 
Cong (2017) at 22 [Gelpern, Testimony before the US House of Representatives]; Anna Gelpern, 
“Sovereign Debt: Now What?” (2016) 41 Yale J Intl L Online Special Edition 45 at 79.
18. Gelpern, Testimony before the US House of Representatives, supra note 17 at 23; Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, “The Greek Debt Restructuring: 
An Autopsy” (2013) 28 Econ Pol’y 513 at 527.
(2019) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL404
remained outstanding.19 Based on this unusual interpretation, which was upheld 
by the Second Circuit, the district court issued an injunction that not only 
forbade Argentina from paying the exchange bondholders, but also threatened to 
sanction financial market utilities, trustees, and everyone else who acted “in active 
concert or participation” with the Republic. As a result, payment intermediaries 
that feared being held in contempt of the court refused to process payments 
under the exchange bonds. The injunction even applied to entities such as 
Euroclear that were in foreign jurisdictions and governed by foreign law.20 Cut 
off from the global financial system and unable to raise money on bond markets, 
the newly-elected government of Mauricio Macri decided to end the holdout 
saga. On 22 April 2016, NML received a payment of US$2.426 billion. The 
payment meant that NML, which had paid only 28 cents a dollar for the bonds, 
or US$177 million in total, made a 1270 per cent return on its investment. This 
outcome provides a remarkable demonstration of how a small group of creditors 
can extract preferential treatment at the expense of all other stakeholders and 
even third parties.
The disorder of the status quo arguably has adverse consequences not only 
for the domestic economies of indebted sovereigns but for the global economy 
more broadly. In the economies of borrowing governments, defaults and 
restructuring processes plagued by delays and uncertainty can lead to significant 
economic and social dislocation, which can then have spillover effects into 
integrated economies. Furthermore, unsustainable sovereign debt may pose a 
systemic risk to the international financial system.21 In addition, creditors as a 
whole are likely prejudiced by the current regime, and economists have suggested 
that improved governance of debt restructuring could lead to a net improvement 
to the aggregated economic outcomes of all parties.22 
19. NML Capital v Argentina, 2012, supra note 3 at 257-61.
20. For further discussion of these injunctions, see Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 5.
21. See Jay L Westbrook, “Sovereign Debt and Exclusions from Insolvency Proceedings” in 
Christoph G Paulus, ed, A Debt Restructuring Mechanism for Sovereigns: Do we need a Legal 
Procedure? (Oxford: Hart, 2014) 251 at 251. Lloyd Blankfein, the former CEO of Goldman 
Sachs, has also commented that, in recent years, sovereign debt has become a major source of 
global financial uncertainty. See Sridhar Natarajan, “Blankfein Sees Italy Turmoil as Biggest 
Sovereign Debt Threat,” Bloomberg (19 June 2018), online: <www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-06-19/blankfein-sees-italy-turmoil-as-biggest-sovereign-debt-threat>.
22. See Joseph E Stiglitz et al, Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: IPD-CIGI-CGEG 
Policy Brief (New York: Columbia University, School of International and Public 
Affairs & Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014) at para 3, online: 
< http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/IPD-CIGI-CGEG_Report_-_FSDR_
Conference_R.pdf>.
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As discussed above, there have been several attempts to improve upon 
the current approach to sovereign debt. The following section will outline 
attempts to address the deficiencies of the current system through a formalized, 
treaty-based approach.
II. THE LONG QUEST FOR A FORMAL SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM
The quest for a formal mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring at the 
international level dates back at least to a Pan American Conference in December 
1933, when Mexico’s foreign minister José Manuel Puig called for a public 
international organization to take care of debt negotiations and arrangements.23 
Puig’s proposal was meant to strengthen the bargaining position of the debtor 
countries vis-à-vis private creditors who had organized themselves into powerful 
Banker Committees.24 However, the proposal failed to generate sufficient support. 
Other Latin American countries argued that the creation of such an international 
organization would send a negative signal to foreign investors. The United States 
also refused to support the proposal because it did not want to be involved in any 
discussions regarding private investors’ claims.25
The next noteworthy attempt came during the Bretton Woods negotiations 
in the late 1940s. The initial blueprints of the IMF provided that member states 
could not default on external loans without the approval of the Fund.26 This 
provision was intended to empower the Fund to engage in compulsory arbitration 
in debt negotiations.27 Similarly, the initial charter of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) prohibited the Bank from lending 
to countries that had defaulted on foreign loans except when a debt workout 
was approved by a Bank’s special committee appointed for this purpose.28 These 
23. See Eric Helleiner, “The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” 
(2008) 27 Contributions to Pol Econ 91 at 95.
24. Ibid at 9596; Skylar Brooks & Domenico Lombardi, “Governing Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Through Regulatory Standards” (2016) 6 J Globalization & Dev 287 at 290.
25. See Helleiner, supra note 23 at 97.
26. The document can be found in J Keith Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund 
1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, vol 3 (Washington, DC: 
IMF, 1969) at 44, 71.
27. Ibid at 71.
28. See Suggested Outline of a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and 
Associated States, art B.4, quoted in Robert W Oliver, International Economic Co-operation 
and the World Bank (New York: HM Publishers, 1975) at 292.
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provisions were never incorporated into the Articles of Agreement of the IMF or 
the IBRD. There was a concern that Latin American countries would find the 
provisions offensive and would not be willing to support institutions that would 
likely refuse to lend them money. At the same time, others thought that such 
provisions would substantially tilt the balance in favour of debtors and give them 
too much power in debt negotiations.29
Sovereign debt was initially largely absent from political circles in the 
post-war decades due to limited international lending to developing countries.30 
This situation changed dramatically following the oil shock of 1973, when 
many developing countries borrowed heavily from international banks. By the 
late 1970s, it was clear that the loans were unsustainable, and that there was a 
need for debt restructuring.31 In 1978, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) put forward the idea of a more institutionalized 
restructuring mechanism. The G77 picked up and expanded on this idea and 
proposed an international debt commission that would examine debt and 
development issues and facilitate restructuring by mediating between debtors 
and creditors.32 The proposal was ultimately dropped because of opposition by 
Western governments and banks that feared it could encourage more applications 
for debt relief and shift the terms of bargaining in favour of sovereign debtors.33
While arguments for a more formal restructuring mechanism continued in 
the 1980s and 1990s, they received little official interest.34 It was not until the 
early 2000s that the issue was put back on the official agenda. In a November 
2001 speech, Anne Kruger, the IMF Deputy Managing Director, put forward 
an ambitious proposal for a formalized sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
that came to be known as the SDRM.35 The SDRM’s objective was to “provide 
29. Helleiner, supra note 23 at 102-103; Oliver, supra note 28 at 143-44, 375.
30. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, “Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History 
of Ideas, 19762001” (2002) 49 IMF Staff Papers 470 at 471.
31. Kathryn C Lavelle, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Alliances Crossing the Financial Services 
Industry, States, and Nongovernmental Organizations” in Tony Porter & Karsten Ronit, eds, 
The Challenges of Global Business Authority: Democratic Renewal, Stalemate, or Decay? (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2010) 257 at 261; Helleiner, supra note 23 at 104.
32. Ibid at 262; Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003) at 144-45.
33. See Susanne Soederberg, “The Transnational Debt Architecture and Emerging Markets: The 
Politics of Paradoxes and Punishment” (2005) 26 Third World Q 927 at 935.
34. See Rogoff & Zettelmeyer, supra note 30 at 483.
35. See Anne Krueger, “A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (26 
November 2001), online: International Monetary Fund <www.imf.org/en/News/
Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp112601> [perma.cc/H72J-J27D]. 
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a framework that strengthens incentives for a sovereign and its creditors to 
reach a rapid and collaborative agreement on a restructuring of unsustainable 
debt.”36 It sought to improve collective action among creditors by establishing 
a legal framework that would empower a supermajority of creditors to make 
critical decisions binding on all creditors.37 A key component of the SDRM was 
a “Dispute Resolution Forum” (DRF) tasked with facilitating and monitoring 
the restructuring as well as resolving disputes between the sovereign debtor and 
creditors.38 The DRF could also impose a stay on all enforcement actions against 
the debtor while restructuring was taking place.39 The IMF would finance the 
DRF and select its members, but the DRF would operate independently from 
the Fund.40 The SDRM and the DRF would be established by amending the 
IMF Articles of Agreement, which would require approval of three-fifths of the 
members. Once approved, all members would be bound by the new provisions.41
The SDRM initially gained support from Western governments, including 
the US, UK, Canada, and Switzerland, but it soon became evident that success 
would be difficult to achieve.42 Emerging market borrowers, such as Mexico and 
Brazil, argued that the initiative would increase their borrowing costs. They were 
nervous that private investors would perceive the mechanism as an inducement 
to default and therefore make capital more expensive.43 Some expressed concerns 
about the IMF’s conflict of interest, finding it hard to see the Fund as an 
independent observer when it had exposure to debtors itself.44 The proposal 
also encountered strong opposition from the private sector community, which 
saw the proposal as encouraging more restructuring, in turn reducing private 
capital flows.45 Finally, the last blow came from the US government shifting its 
36. See International Monetary Fund, Report of the Managing Director to the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee on a Statutory Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: 
Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Washington, DC: 
8 April 2003) art 1, online: <www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2003/040803.htm> 
[perma.cc/59QB-YWCM].
37. Ibid, art 11.
38. Ibid, art 13.
39. Ibid, art 7(c).
40. Ibid, art 13 (i-ii).
41. Ibid, art 14.
42. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, “How CACs Became Boilerplate, or, the Politics 
of Contract Change” (2004) Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper, online: 
<academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:126625> [perma.cc/4LP8-26XP] at 5-16. 
43. Ibid at 16; Helleiner, supra note 23 at 110.
44. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 42 at 16; Lavelle, supra note 31 at 269; Westbrook, supra 
note 21 at 256.
45. See Lavelle, supra note 31 at 269.
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support from the SDRM to a market-based, contractual approach.46 The SDRM 
initiative was eventually put in abeyance in 2003.47
The idea of a formal debt restructuring mechanism returned to policy circles 
in the aftermath of the Argentinian and Greek debt crises. In September 2014, the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution calling for the 
“establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring 
processes.”48 The UNGA followed up with another resolution in December 
2014, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes. The Ad Hoc Committee held a number of meetings in 2015 that 
led to agreement on adherence to a number of principles, such as legitimacy, 
good faith, impartiality, and fairness, in sovereign debt restructurings.49 These 
principles, which came to be known as the “Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Processes,” were endorsed by a General Assembly Resolution 
in 2015.50 While the aforementioned UN resolutions were adopted by large 
majorities, developed economies, including the US, UK, Japan, and the EU, 
either voted against them or abstained.51 These jurisdictions, along with the IMF 
and the World Bank, did not attend the Ad Hoc Committee’s meetings and 
explicitly refused to engage in any intergovernmental negotiations.52 As a result, 
46. The G-7 Action Plan in 2002 supported “a market-oriented approach to the sovereign debt 
restructuring process in which new contingency clauses would be incorporated into debt 
contracts.” Canada chaired the G-7 process that year and it was the actually Canadian deputy 
who presented G-7’s work on CACs. See Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, Washington, DC (20 April 2002) online: G8 Research Group <www.
g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm022004.htm#action> [perma.cc/32ML-UD9F]; Gelpern & 
Gualti, supra note 42 at 26, n 143.
47. François Gianviti et al, A European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution: A Proposal 
(Brussels: Bruegel, 9 November 2010) at 19; Lavelle, supra note 31 at 270.
48. Towards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring 
processes, GA Res A/RES/68/304, UNGA, 68th Sess, A/RES/68/304 (2014).
49. United Nations Ad hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt Structuring Processes, Committee 
Report Second Part: Chairperson Summary, UNCTAD 3rd Working Sess (2015).
50. Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes, GA Res 69/319, UNGA, 69th Sess, 
A/RES/69/319, (2015).
51. The US, UK, Japan, Germany, Canada voted against both Resolution 68/304, “Towards the 
establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes,” 
and Resolution 69/319, “Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes.” For 
the voting records of these resolutions, see General Assembly of the United Nations, “Voting 
Records” (last visited 10 September 2017), online: <www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.
asp> [perma.cc/GEL3-T6TG].
52. See Charles W Mooney Jr, “A Framework for a Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism: The KISS Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) and Other Guiding Principles” 
(2015) 37 Mich J Intl L 57 at 66, n 36.
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the UN’s initiative, which marked the latest official attempt to create a binding 
multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes, has not 
yielded any meaningful progress.
III. THE CURRENT CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
The preferred approach of creditors and developed country governments to-date 
has been to regulate sovereign debt restructuring through contractual mechanisms. 
The primary contractual tool to regulate restructurings is the collective action 
clause (CAC), which binds all creditors to the will of a super-majority. This 
feature attempts to address the problem of holdout creditors and simulates the 
majority voting provisions found in domestic restructuring regimes. However, 
the traditional CAC only allowed for voting within a single series of bonds, 
thereby addressing the collective action problem only within a relatively small 
group. Therefore under these initial aggregation mechanisms, holdout creditors 
would not have great difficulty in defeating the restructuring process overall.
The unsettling consequences of the Argentinian litigation led the 
International Capital Markets Association (ICMA), a trade association for 
participants in global capital markets, to release a new set of model provisions 
to be included in sovereign bond contracts. These provisions contain enhanced 
CACs—sometimes referred to as CACs 2.0, or second-generation CACs—that 
allow for the aggregation of a sovereign’s bond debt beyond a single series. Under 
these provisions, a sovereign may still choose to restructure a single series, but 
may also aggregate across series under either a two-limb or single-limb voting 
procedure. The three restructuring options that ICMA’s model CAC provisions 
offer a sovereign issuer are as follows:
Modification of a single series of bonds, as before, with a requirement that three-
quarters of a series agree to the restructuring;
Modification of multiple series of bonds, with the requirement that the restructuring 
be approved half of each series polled, and two-thirds of all outstanding debt polled 
(two-limb voting); and
Modification of multiple series of bonds, with one aggregated vote amongst all 
bondholders, with a requirement that three-quarters of total bonds approve the 
restructuring.53
53. ICMA, “Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses (“CACS”) for the Terms and 
Conditions of Sovereign Notes” (August 2014) online: <www.icmagroup.org/assets/
documents/Resources/ICMA-Standard-CACs-August-2014.pdf> [perma.cc/T3DB-CM9T].
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Following their introduction, CACs 2.0 were endorsed by the IMF 
Executive Board and the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Banks Governors.54 
In November 2014, Mexico made the first public offering with the new clauses 
under New York law, selling US$2 billion in 10-year bonds. A significant point 
about the Mexican issuance is that it contradicted the speculation that markets 
would demand a greater interest rate for the inclusion of CACs. In fact, the 2014 
issuance locked in the lowest interest rates in Mexican history and CACs 2.0 
had no impact on the bonds’ pricing whatsoever.55 Since then there has been a 
substantial uptake of CACs 2.0 in new bonds issuances without any observable 
impact on bonds’ pricing.56
The model ICMA provisions also contain a new standard pari passu clause, 
drafted to clarify the meaning of pari passu and avoid the difficulties that Argentina 
faced in the New York courts. Most importantly, the new provision clarifies that 
it does not prevent a sovereign issuer from paying one creditor without at the 
same time paying all others, following the traditional meaning of pari passu that 
it is only the bonds and not their payments that rank equally.57
Despite being a positive step forward, as discussed above these contractual 
reforms have so far been unable to provide a complete solution to the sovereign 
restructuring problem. As of October 2016, a substantial stock of outstanding 
sovereign bonds—worth US$846 billion—lacks robust aggregate voting 
mechanisms. It is also likely that not all new sovereign bond issuances will contain 
enhanced contractual provisions.58 For example, 74 out of 228 bond issuances 
made from October 2014 to October 2016, representing US$68 billion, lacked 
enhanced contractual provisions.59 The most recent IMF survey in 2017 indicated 
54. See International Monetary Fund, Press Release, No 14/466, “Communiqué of the Thirtieth 
Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Chaired by Mr. Tharman 
Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Minister for Finance, October 
11, 2014” (11 October 2014), online: <www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/
pr14466> [perma.cc/U7V8-BGJD]; Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, “G20 
Leaders’ Communiqué” (16 November 2014), online: G20 Information Centre <www.g20.
utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1116-communique.html> [perma.cc/HUT8-7MM3].
55. Mark Sobel, “Strengthening Collective Action Clauses: Catalysing Change—The Back Story” 
(2016) 11 Capital Markets LJ 3 at 10.
56. International Monetary Fund, Second Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual 
Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts (IMF, December 2016) at 6 [IMF, 
“Second Progress Report”].
57. ICMA, “Standard Pari Passu provision For the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign 
Notes” (August 2014) online: <www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Resources/
ICMA-Standard-Pari-Passu-Provision-August-2014.pdf> [perma.cc/QVN8-XFZE].
58. See IMF, “Second Progress Report,” supra note 56 at 3, 6-7.
59. Ibid at 3.
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that the new bonds issued under New York law by Lebanon, Korea, Philippines, 
as well as new bonds issued under English law by Azerbaijan, Hungary, Malaysia, 
and Poland did not include enhanced CACs.60
Moreover, even the enhanced aggregate voting mechanisms suffer from 
important limitations, such as the fact that they only apply to bonds and exclude 
other important forms of sovereign debt, such as syndicated or bilateral loans.61 
Accordingly, due both to the inability of CACs to bind all of a sovereign’s creditors 
and the absence of CACs in a substantial portion of existing sovereign bonds, the 
risk of disruptive holdout litigation continues to overhang sovereign debt.
At the time of writing, for example, holdouts present an imminent danger 
in the case of Venezuela, a country engulfed in an economic crisis and in 
default on virtually all its external debt.62 It is clear that the Republic cannot 
continue servicing its debt and a restructuring of some form will be inevitable. 
Restructuring Venezuela’s debt, however, will likely be challenging with respect 
to bonds issued by the PDVSA, the Venezuelan national oil company. Standing 
at about US$25 billion, the PDVSA bonds are governed by New York law and 
lack any contractual clauses that would permit a super-majority of creditors to 
60. International Monetary Fund, Third Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced 
Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts (Washington, DC: 
15 December 2017) at 3.
61. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Sovereign Damage Control, by Anna 
Gelpern, Policy Brief 13-12 (May 2013) at 13, online: <piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/
sovereign-damage-control?ResearchID=2395> [perma.cc/8SJ3-PJZC].
62. The magnitude of the Venezuelan economic and social crisis could be better understood by 
looking at some of the recent forecasts. The Venezuela Congress reported that the inflation 
reached an annual 83,000 per cent in July 2018. Economists in Caracas have forecasted 
an inflation of 300,000 to 400,000 per cent for the year and the IMF even goes further 
to suggest that the country is heading for 1,000,000 per cent inflation. According to the 
UN, 2.3 million, 7 per cent of the entire population, have left Venezuela since 2015. For 
further information, see Gideon Long “Venezuelans left reeling by dollar shortages and 
hyper-inflation,” Financial Times (24 August 2018), online: <www.ft.com/content/2506f266-
a72b-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b> [perma.cc/H7KC-8EL2]; Alejandro Werner, “Outlook for 
the Americas: A Tougher Recovery” (23 July 2018), online (blog): IMFBlog <blogs.imf.
org/2018/07/23/outlook-for-the-americas-a-tougher-recovery> perma.cc/9548-3HFZ]; 
Gideon Long “Hollowed-out Venezuela counts the cost of crisis,” Financial Times (4 
September 2018) online: <www.ft.com/content/55bd21a8-b02e-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c> 
[perma.cc/P3NV-MSUJ]. On Venezuela’s default, see Edward White & Hudson Lockett 
“S&P Says Venezuela is in default on sovereign debt,” Financial Times (14 November 2017) 
online: <www.ft.com/content/88bc3246-c8f4-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e> [perma.cc/
K8JD-YSCW]; Lee C Buchheit & G Mitu Gulati, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring and US 
Executive Power” (2018) 14 Capital Markets LJ 114 at 127.
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approve a restructuring binding on all creditors.63 Similar to most other bonds 
issued under foreign law in international markets, the PDVSA bonds have 
waived sovereign immunity and some of them even contain the same pari passu 
clause that was used by the holdouts in Argentina v NML Capital.64 Inspired 
by the recent Argentinian saga, it can be expected that holdouts will intervene 
and seek to interfere with any restructuring attempts. They can sue the PDVSA 
in foreign courts, obtaining judgements to seize Venezuelan oil shipments and 
intercept international payments.65 Any of these actions could have devastating 
consequences for the Venezuelan economy, which derives 95 per cent of its 
international revenue from the sale of oil.66
IV. A MORE REALISTIC REFORM ALTERNATIVE: SOVEREIGN 
DEBT RESTRUCTURING MODEL LAW
A. ADVANTAGES OF A MODEL LAW APPROACH
This article has thus far argued that the treaty approach to improving sovereign 
debt restructuring is politically infeasible, and that the contractual approach 
is insufficient. This section of the article suggests a third alternative, namely 
restructuring legislation adopted by a jurisdiction under whose laws a sovereign 
could issue its debt. This has been called the “Model Law” approach, and was 
originally suggested by Professor Steven L. Schwartz of Duke University’s School 
63. Lee C Buchheit & G Mitu Gulati, “How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt (¿Cómo 
restructurar la deuda venezolana?) (Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series 
No 2017-52, 2017), online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3006680> 
[perma.cc/U4CS-5NMW] at 3, 6; Clifford Krauss, “Venezuela Staves Off Default, but 
Low Oil Prices Pose a Threat,” New York Times (12 April 2017), online: <www.nytimes.
com/2017/04/12/business/venezuela-oil-debt-payment.html> [perma.cc/Y72E-T6WL].
64. W Mark, C Weidemaier & Matt Gauthier, “Venezuela as a Case Study in (Limited) 
Sovereign Liability” (2017) 12 Capital Markets LJ 215 at 215-16. For a discussion of the 
proceedings in Argentina v NML Capital, see Parts I & II, above.
65. In fact, Bloomberg recently reported that three hedge funds holding about 15 per cent of 
the outstanding of Venezuela’s 2034 bonds (US$1.5 billion) have hired the same law firm 
which represented Aurelius Capital Management in the Argentina litigation to explore legal 
enforcement options. The group has the minimum threshold to block any key modifications, 
and therefore restructuring, of the bond contracts. See, for further information, Katia 
Porzecanski, “New Venezuela Creditor Group Emerges to Tackle Defaulted Debt,” Bloomberg 
(31 May 2018) online: Bloomberg <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-31/
new-venezuela-creditors-group-emerges-to-tackle-defaulted-debt>.
66. Jim Wyss et al, “Threat of U.S. oil sanctions on Venezuela sparks fears of economic ‘collapse’” 
Miami Herald (18 July 2017) online: <www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/venezuela/article162281848.html>.
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of Law in 2015.67 Despite the name given to this approach, we note at the outset 
that the proposed Model Law differs from other existing model laws in that the 
coordination of countries’ domestic legal regimes is not its principal objective.68 
Instead, the purpose of the Model Law is to allow sovereigns to “opt-in” 
to a legislative restructuring regime by issuing their debt under the laws of a 
single enacting jurisdiction; while enactment of the law by multiple jurisdictions 
may lead to further benefits, duplication is not necessary for the sovereign debt 
restructuring Model Law to have efficacy.
The proposed Model Law is therefore a sort of hybrid between a formal, 
treaty-based regime and the existing contractual approach. Like with a treaty, 
the rules governing the restructuring would be publicly available and based 
in law, rather than in the parties’ contracts: The Model Law would allow the 
rules of a potential restructuring to be known by all affected parties in advance, 
thereby enhancing the rule of law surrounding sovereign debt restructuring. 
The Model Law, however, has significantly greater political feasibility than an 
international treaty; while sovereign issuers and their creditors would need to 
select the law of the enacting jurisdiction to govern their debt contracts, this 
option becomes available to them as soon as even one country enacts the Model 
Law as domestic legislation.
The Model Law approach also preserves the freedom of contract that exists 
in the current contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring. The Model 
Law would not be imposed upon a government or its creditors. Instead, the main 
basis for the application of the Model Law would be contractual, by means of 
the parties’ choice of law clause. Sovereigns and their creditors would effectively 
choose to be governed by the Model Law by selecting the law of the enacting 
67. Steven L Schwarcz, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law Approach” (2015) 6 
J Globalization & Dev 343 at 380-81; Steven L Schwarcz, “A Model-Law Approach to 
Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt” (21 August 2015), online (pdf ): Centre for 
International Governance Innovation <www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/
PB%20no.64%20Updated_1.pdf> [perma.cc/S7TZ-43XE]. The full text of the Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Model Law can be found in the appendix of both documents and 
has been also annexed, with the author’s permission, to this article [Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Model Law].
68. For examples of model laws in which uniformity is a primary objective, consider the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC (1995)), and the UNICITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration. See United Nations Commission of International Trade Law, Status 
of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments 
as adopted in 2006 (Vienna, 2008), online: <www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf> [perma.cc/D7V3-SPLM].
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jurisdiction to govern the contract.69 A corollary of this, however, is that the 
Model Law approach would share a limitation of the contractual approach in 
that it would depend on the will of the parties to choose to be governed by the 
enacting jurisdiction, just as the contractual approach depends on the parties to 
include aggregation clauses and well-defined terms.
However, we suggest that the Model Law approach offers benefits over and 
above the contractual approach. The Model Law does not only allow for enhanced 
aggregation of bond debt, similar to the second generation of CACs, but it may 
also allow other types of debt to be included in a restructuring process.70 The 
Model Law also contains provision for a neutral supervisory authority to oversee 
and provide structure to the process, as well as an arbitration mechanism to settle 
any disputes that arise between the parties.71 Importantly, therefore, even if voting 
is not aggregated across types of debt (which may prove to be a difficult feat) 
under the Model Law, the centralized and supervised forum provided for by the 
Model Law would enhance communication, transparency, and fairness among 
all affected parties. Given the uncertainty and unpredictability of the status quo, 
the possibility of strengthening the global rule of law surrounding sovereign debt 
restructuring may be one of the greatest advantages of the Model Law approach.
An additional benefit of the Model Law is the availability of emergency 
liquidity that would rank ahead of other claims.72 Obtaining new sources of 
funding has always been a major difficulty for distressed sovereigns, particularly 
because new lenders are reluctant to lend money in the absence of gaining priority 
for the repayment claim.73 The Model Law addresses this problem by granting 
priority to new lenders over existing creditors, provided that existing creditors 
have notice and the opportunity to block the lending if the loan is too large or 
the terms are inappropriate.74
Due to its form as domestic legislation, the Model Law also allows for 
continued experimentation and incrementalism; changing the procedure to 
69. One alternative version of the Model Law requires parties to not only select the law of the 
enacting jurisdiction to govern their contract, but also to expressly choose to be governed by 
the Model Law. See the alternative formulation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law, 
supra note 67, art 1(1)(a).
70. A restructuring plan will become effective and binding if it is approved by creditors holding 
two-thirds in value and more than half in number of a class of claims concerned. See 
ibid, art 7(2).
71. Ibid, arts 2, 3, 10.
72. Ibid, c IV.
73. See generally Stiglitz, supra note 22 at paras 8-10.
74. Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law, supra note 67, arts 8-9.
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reflect lessons learned would require legislative amendment in one jurisdiction, 
rather than simultaneously amending many debt contracts. However, the 
ease with which the restructuring process could be changed by the enacting 
jurisdiction would require market participants—both the sovereign issuer along 
with creditors—to have significant faith in the neutrality and fairness of the 
enacting jurisdiction. An appropriate enacting jurisdiction is therefore crucial to 
the success of the Model Law.
The first jurisdiction to enact the law would also likely realize significant 
benefits within its borders, which would serve as a sort of remuneration for its 
role in creating the global public interest benefits that would result from the 
Model Law. The following section will outline benefits that would likely accrue to 
the first jurisdiction to adopt the legislation, and will recommend the Province of 
Ontario, with support from the federal Canadian government, as an appropriate 
jurisdiction to lead this innovative approach to sovereign debt restructuring.
B. THE MODEL LAW AS A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY FOR ONTARIO
The first jurisdiction to enact the Model Law has the potential to receive 
significant advantages in its capacity as a first mover on this initiative; moreover, 
it is likely that the Model Law would not entail any adverse consequences for the 
adopting jurisdiction.75 The advantages associated with being the first jurisdiction 
to adopt the Model Law would arise primarily through the growth of that 
jurisdiction’s financial and legal sectors. The Model Law would create business 
opportunities for local financial institutions to act as intermediaries in sovereign 
debt transactions, and for law firms of the enacting jurisdiction to advise on debt 
75. At a roundtable conference sponsored by CIGI on 28 February 2017, two potential areas of 
concern were identified regarding the proposed Model Law: reputational concerns around 
being associated with sovereign defaults, and any impact of the Model Law on the status 
of the province’s debt. However, our view is that no problems will arise related to either of 
these issues. Just as New York and England are not blamed when a sovereign defaults on 
loans governed by their law, there is no reason to believe that Ontario would be blamed 
should a sovereign default on, or require the restructuring of, a bond issued under Ontario 
law. Conversely, our view is that Ontario could enjoy enhanced international stature by 
virtue of its leadership in offering a solution to this important global problem. Furthermore, 
the enactment of the Model Law would not add to the province’s financial burden and 
could be drafted so as to exclude Ontario’s debt, if desired. See Maziar Peihani & Kim 
Jensen, “The Model Law Approach: How Ontario Could Lead the World in Providing 
Certainty and Fairness in Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (28 February 2017), online: 
Centre for International Governance Innovation <www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/
documents/2017%20SDR%20Round%20Table%20Report%20WEB.pdf> [perma.cc/
JPC2-GQB3] at 3.
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contracts. Furthermore, it is common practice for parties to a sovereign debt 
contract to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in the same jurisdiction of the 
law governing the contract. English and New York courts, for example, are the 
two primary forums for sovereign debt disputes given that most foreign sovereign 
bonds are also governed by English or New York law. Similarly, depending on 
the institutions selected by the Model Law, domestic entities could be designated 
to supervise the restructuring process, and local arbitrators and courts could be 
designated to hear disputes arising under the Model Law.
The first jurisdiction to enact the law could also see a rise in its international 
reputation due to its leadership in resolving an important global issue. 
As discussed above, there is widespread international support for improved 
mechanisms to govern the restructuring of sovereign debt, as illustrated by the 
passing of two UN General Assembly resolutions in 2014.76 The opposition to a 
treaty by some developed countries would likely not carry over to the Model Law 
approach, given that the latter retains freedom of contract for both issuers and 
their creditors. Instead, the first jurisdiction to enact the law would likely be seen 
as offering an innovative and creative solution to a global problem that, prior to 
its leadership, had long proved intractable.
However, a caveat to the above is that these benefits will only be realized if the 
enacting jurisdiction is trusted by market participants; sovereign issuers and their 
creditors must be willing to have their debt contracts be governed by the law of 
the enacting jurisdiction in order for the Model Law to take practical effect. This 
requires the jurisdiction that enacts the law to have an international reputation for 
political stability and rule of law. Furthermore, given the reliance of the sovereign 
debt market on existing financial infrastructure, the ideal jurisdiction would have 
an established financial sector that could support expansion into the market for 
sovereign debt. Finally, because most existing foreign-law governed sovereign 
debt is issued under either New York or English law, many of the Model Law’s 
proponents believe that a successful Model Law State would most likely be a 
common law jurisdiction, in order to facilitate easier integration with existing 
capital markets and legal systems in London and New York. 
We suggest that, on all criteria, the province of Ontario is well placed to take the 
lead as the first mover in adopting the Model Law. Ontario is of course a common 
law jurisdiction. Already, federal and Ontario bonds are predominantly issued 
under Ontario law (and the laws of Canada as applicable in Ontario) and benefit 
76. See Part II, above, for a discussion of the UN General Assembly resolutions.
PEIHANI, JEWETT,  A ROLE FOR CANADA? 417
from the legal infrastructure available in the province.77 An Ontario-adopted 
Model Law that strikes the right balance between the interests of creditors and 
debtors would make Ontario attractive to foreign issuers as well. Developing 
economies would find it particularly attractive to issue debt in Toronto and to 
choose Ontario law to govern their contracts. Both New York and London came 
to dominate the sovereign debt business not only because of their deep capital 
markets but also through offering their laws to govern foreign sovereign debt 
contracts. Both jurisdictions facilitated the issuance of foreign bonds by allowing 
sovereigns to choose New York or English laws to govern their transactions, even 
when the bonds were actually listed elsewhere.78 Historically, sovereign issuers 
have been ready to accept the legal system of a foreign jurisdiction to govern their 
contracts and hear their disputes if that foreign jurisdiction enjoys a reputation 
for fairness and independence.79 
In addition to its attractiveness to sovereign borrowers, Ontario law 
would be an appealing choice to foreign investors who are often reluctant to 
buy debt governed by the issuer’s domestic law. These investors fear that the 
sovereign debtor could unilaterally change its law to discharge its obligations 
and defeat their legitimate contractual expectations. Such concerns do not apply 
if Ontario law governs, given both Canada and Ontario’s reputations for rule of 
law, an independent and fair judiciary, and legal safeguards to protect creditors’ 
reasonable expectations.
Ontario is also well positioned to take the lead on the Model Law initiative 
due to Toronto’s position as a global financial centre and the principal financial 
centre within Canada. Moreover, the adoption of the Model Law is well aligned 
with the Ontario government priority to advance the success of the financial 
77. See e.g. Department of Finance Canada, “Legal Terms and Conditions for Government of 
Canada Domestic Debt Securities” (last modified 30 March 2015), online: <www.fin.gc.ca/
invest/dds-tmi-eng.asp> [perma.cc/R2PK-8HJR].
78. See Dilip Ratha, Supriyo De & Sergio Kurlat, “Does Governing Law Affect Bond 
Spreads?” (2016) World Bank Development Economics Global Indicators Group Policy 
Research Working Paper No WPS7863, online: World Bank <documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/903341476714665225/Does-governing-law-affect-bond-spreads> [perma.cc/
V9AE-2ANU] at 3.
79. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Josefin Meyer & Mitu Gulati, “The Sovereign Debt Listing 
Puzzle” (2016) Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No 
2017-4 1 at 6-7, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2853917> 
[perma.cc/5HMZ-P3NP].
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services industry and increase jobs and investments in the sector.80 Toronto is 
home to many leading banks, insurers, securities dealers, and pension funds, and 
continuously ranks as one of the best financial centres in the world.81 Furthermore, 
Toronto is an excellent investment destination for major international financial 
institutions. In 2015, it ranked fifth among North American cities for inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in financial services, accounting for US$95.5 
million investment.82 In terms of outward FDI, Toronto ranks second only 
to New York, accounting for more than one billion US dollars.83 Moreover, 
Canadian capital markets raised C$382 billion during 2015 and the TMX 
Group’s market capitalization stood at C$2.8 trillion as of the end of March 
2017.84 Adding to Ontario’s tool kit of finance-related services a facility to resolve 
sovereign debt would strengthen the province’s standing in a competitive but 
changing global marketplace.
The uncertainty created by Brexit and the Trump Administration’s criticism 
of the global trading system has implications for financial markets around the 
world, and may create opportunities to shift the trade winds of global finance. 
Ontario’s reputation for political stability and rule of law and its excellent financial 
infrastructure provide the province with an opportunity to lead the world in the 
development of international norms and advance its own competitive position 
through the adoption of the Model Law. While there may be authority for 
Ontario to pursue this initiative independently under the division of powers 
in Canada’s constitution, given the novelty of the proposed regime and the 
paramount need for legal stability, our view is that a collaborative approach 
between the Ontario and the federal government is the superior course of action. 
80. See generally Ministry of Finance, Jobs for Today and Tomorrow 2016 Ontario Budget, 
by The Honourable Charles Sousa at 3-56, online: <www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/
ontariobudgets/2016/papers_all.pdf> [perma.cc/3S9D-P26W].
81. See Silvia Pavoni, “Brexit-Bound London Stays Top of IFC Tree Rankings,” The Banker 
(September 2017), online: <tfi.ca/policy-research/international-financial-centres-rankings> 
[perma.cc/P3S4-A6AS].




84. See “Dealmakers 2016,” Financial Post (28 January 2016), online: <business.financialpost.
com/investing/outlook-2016/dealmakers-2016-click-here-for-all-our-data> [perma.cc/
HG3K-KAQR]; “TMX Group Equity Financing Statistics - March 2017,” Canada NewsWire 
(7 April 2017), online: <web.tmxmoney.com/article.php?newsid=7604795236533080&qm_
symbol=X> [perma.cc/3QMW-CBN7].
PEIHANI, JEWETT,  A ROLE FOR CANADA? 419
The issue of the constitutional authority to enact the Model Law is discussed in 
the following section.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Because Canada is a federation with legislative power allocated between the 
federal and provincial legislatures, any serious consideration of a Model Law to be 
adopted by Ontario must include a consideration of constitutional jurisdiction 
to make such an enactment. Could Ontario unilaterally enact a Model Law? 
Or would such a provision require coordinated legislation between Ontario 
and the Parliament of Canada? The answers to these questions are rooted in the 
division of powers set out in the Constitution Act, 1867, and the potential overlap 
between separate heads of power. Of particular relevance are section 91(21), 
which grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over “Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency,” and section 92(13), which gives the provinces similar jurisdiction 
over “Property and Civil Rights in the Province,” also referred to as “civil law.”85 
The constitutional question is usually framed as “What is the legislation in ‘pith 
and substance’?”
I. BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY
The Model Law shares features with laws whose pith and substance has been 
found to be bankruptcy and insolvency. The Companies’ Creditors Arrangements 
Act (CCAA) is federal legislation allowing debtor companies with claims of at 
least C$5 million to make court-sanctioned compromises or arrangements with 
their creditors.86 Despite that it did not deal directly with matters of bankruptcy, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the first enactment of this legislation in 
1933 was a valid exercise of Parliament’s power in bankruptcy and insolvency.87 
Shortly thereafter, similar federal legislation targeting farmers, The Farmers’ 
Creditors Arrangements Act, 1934 was also upheld as pertaining to bankruptcy 
and insolvency.88
85. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 (UK), ss 91(21), 92(13), reprinted in RSC 
1985, Appendix II, No 5.
86. Companies’ Creditors Arrangements Act, RSC 1985, c C-36.
87. Reference Re Constitutional Validity of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (Dom), [1934] 
SCR 659 [Reference Re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933].
88. British Columbia (AG) v Canada (AG), [1936] SCR 384, (sub nom Reference Re Farmers’ 
Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934), aff’d British Columbia (AG) v Canada (AG) (1937), 1 DLR 
695, (sub nom Reference Re Farmers’ Creditors Arrangements Act, 1934) (PC) [Reference Re 
Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934].
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By contrast, several provincial attempts to regulate debtor-creditor 
relationships in the context of the debtor’s financial distress have been found ultra 
vires the provincial legislature’s jurisdiction in property and civil rights. Some 
statutes purporting to adjust interest rates on certain types and classes of debts 
were held to infringe on Parliament’s exclusive legislative powers in matters of 
interest, granted under section 91(19) of the Constitution Act, 1867.89 Alberta’s 
Debt Adjustment Act of 1937 is of greater relevance to the Model Law.90 This statute 
was enacted during the depression and empowered an administrative body to, 
among other things, impose a debt composition on creditors.91 Despite the fact 
that the Act was not formally predicated on the insolvency of the debtor,92 it was 
nevertheless struck down as a law relating in “pith and substance” to bankruptcy 
and insolvency.93
In our view, however, there is a compelling argument that the proposed 
Model Law would be best characterized as a law in relation to property and civil 
rights, despite its apparent similarity to other laws that have been found to relate 
to bankruptcy and insolvency. As discussed above, the sovereign is only subject 
to the law of the jurisdiction that enacts the Model Law by its own contractual 
choice. Surely, the federal grant of power in bankruptcy and insolvency was never 
intended to regulate the debt contracts of a financially distressed foreign state, 
89. See Credit foncier franco-canadien v Ross (1937), 3 DLR 365 (ABCA); Saskatchewan (AG) 
v Canada (AG) (1949), 2 DLR 145 (PC). A subsequent case, however, narrowly defined 
interest to require the essential characteristic of day-to-day accrual. See Ontario (AG) v 
Barfried Ltd, [1963] SCR 570. A later case then upheld legislation relating to interest as 
a valid exercise of Parliament’s powers under s 91(19) despite that it did not that did not 
deal with the day-to-day accrual of interest. See Tomell Investments Ltd v East Marstock Ltd, 
[1978] 1 SCR 974.
90. The Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, SA 1937, c 9, as amended by SA 1941, c 42.
91. Alberta (AG) v Canada (AG) (1943), 2 DLR 1 (sub nom Reference Re Debt Adjustment Act, 
1937) (PC) [Reference Re Debt Adjustment Act, 1937] at 1213.
92. See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) (loose-leaf 
updated 2018, release 1), ch 25 at 7; For a general discussion on federal and provincial 
powers regarding debt restructuring, bankruptcy, and insolvency, see ch 25. 
93. Reference Re Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, supra note 91. Locke J has stated his opinion that, 
had a similar Debt Adjustment Act been challenged in Saskatchewan, it would have been 
struck down for the same reasons as the Alberta Debt Adjustment Act, 1937. See Canadian 
Bankers’ Association v Saskatchewan (AG) (1955), [1956] SCR 31 at 41. However, a statute 
suspending a creditor’s right to bring an action to recover a loan during a notice period that 
provides a last opportunity for the debtor to repay is a valid exercise of property and civil 
rights in the province. See Bank of Montreal v Hall, [1990] 1 SCR 121.
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and to remove this from the provinces’ more general power in property and civil 
rights in the case that a sovereign chooses to issue its debt under a province’s law.94 
More fundamentally, however, we submit that the regulation of sovereign 
debt contracts does not fall within federal power in bankruptcy and insolvency due 
to a sovereign’s inability to become bankrupt. As discussed above, no bankruptcy 
regime exists for sovereigns, and the Model Law is not purporting to create one. 
While laws pertaining to “insolvency” outside the context of bankruptcy, such 
as the CCAA, have been held intra vires the federal Parliament, all such laws 
addressed entities that have the capacity to become bankrupt under Canadian law.
Numerous cases have explicitly held that the prevention of bankruptcy was a 
feature of valid federal insolvency legislation. Justice Cannon in the Reference Re 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangements Act, 1933, writes:
If the proceedings under this new Act of 1933 are not, strictly speaking, “bankruptcy” 
proceedings, because they had not for object the sale and division of the assets of the 
debtor, they may, however, be considered as “insolvency proceedings” with the object 
of preventing a declaration of bankruptcy and sale of these assets.95 
In the subsequent Reference Re Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, 
Lord Thankerton for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council cited this 
earlier Reference, stating: “it cannot be maintained that legislative provision as 
to compositions, by which bankruptcy is avoided, but which assumes insolvency, 
is not properly within the sphere of bankruptcy legislation.”96 The prevention 
of bankruptcy has furthermore been held to be an objective of the CCAA in 
subsequent judicial decisions.97
Further support for our view that the Model Law may not properly be 
“insolvency” legislation within the meaning of Canadian constitutional law 
can be found in the definition of insolvency used by the courts. In Reference 
94. We further note that dispute resolution mechanisms would be expressly selected in the 
Model Law, which would supersede background domestic dispute resolution procedures. See 
supra note 67, art 10.
95. Reference Re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, supra note 87 at 664 
[emphasis added].
96. Reference Re Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, supra note 88 at 701 [emphasis added].
97. See John D Honsberger & Vern DaRe, Debt Restructuring: Principles and Practice (Toronto: 
Canada Law Book, 1990) (loose-leaf updated 2009, release 29) at s 9:02. “Mr. Justice 
Urquhart of the Supreme Court of Ontario in three separate decisions rendered between 
1939 and 1944 said that the object of the Act was to keep a company in business despite 
insolvency which distinguishes the Act from winding-up or bankruptcy proceedings” 
(footnotes omitted).
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Re Farmers’ Creditors Arrangements Act, 1934, Lord Thankerton, writing for the 
Privy Council, stated: 
In a general sense, insolvency means inability to meet one’s debts or obligations; 
in a technical sense, it means the condition or standard of inability to meet debts 
or obligations, upon the occurrence of which statutory law enables a creditor to 
intervene, with the assistance of the Court, to stop individual action by creditors and 
to secure administration of the debtor’s assets in the general interest of creditors.98 
The implication of this statement is that insolvency, “in a technical sense,” 
is an act of bankruptcy, the commission of which enables creditors to commence 
bankruptcy proceedings. This is stated explicitly by Justice Rand in Canadian 
Bankers Association v Saskatchewan (AG): “The usual mark of insolvency is the 
inability to meet obligations as they mature; it constitutes an act of bankruptcy and 
furnishes ground for proceeding against the debtor under the Bankruptcy Act.”99
We suggest that, because sovereigns are not liable to become bankrupt 
under Canadian law, a sovereign’s inability to pay its debts would not constitute 
“insolvency” in the legal sense, and thus any provincial laws allowing for the 
restructuring of sovereign debt may be properly considered to be outside the federal 
government’s exclusive competence in matters of bankruptcy and insolvency.
Further support for our position can be found in the reasons for which 
matters of bankruptcy are typically assigned to the national government in 
federal jurisdictions. Peter Hogg notes that, along with Canada, both the United 
States and Australia assign competence in bankruptcy matters to their federal 
governments.100 He writes: 
These grants of power recognize that debtors may move from one province to 
another, and may have property and creditors in more than one province. A national 
body of law is required to ensure that all of a debtor’s property is available to satisfy 
the debtor’s debts, that all creditors are fairly treated, and that all are bound by any 
arrangements for the settlement of the debtor’s debts.101 
When no bankruptcy can arise, however, the location of a debtor’s assets is 
irrelevant; and while the sovereign availing itself of the Model Law may indeed 
98. Reference Re Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, supra note 88 at 700.
99. Canadian Bankers’ Associations, supra note 93 at 46 [emphasis added].
100. Hogg, supra note 92, ch 25 at 1.
101. Ibid.
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have debts not governed by the law of an enacting province, this would similarly 
be the case if the law were enacted at the federal level.102
II. TERRITORIAL LIMITATION CONTAINED IN SECTION 92(13)
In our view, therefore, the federal grant of power in bankruptcy and insolvency 
would not necessarily defeat a province’s attempt to enact the Model Law. The 
territorial limitation contained in the wording of section 92(13), however, could 
pose another potential obstacle to the validity of the Model Law. Indeed, at least 
one provincial attempt to regulate debtor-creditor relationships was defeated on 
the basis that affected creditors resided outside the province.103
The judicial interpretation of the territorial limitation contained in section 
92(13) has evolved throughout Canada’s constitutional history. While some early 
cases held that even incidental extra-territorial effects of a law would render it 
ultra vires the enacting province, another line of cases held that such incidental 
effects would not violate the territorial limitation so long as the pith and substance 
of the law related to matters within provincial competence. In 1984, in Reference 
Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, the Supreme Court confirmed 
the second line of cases: It was held that incidental effects on extra-provincial 
rights would not render a law ultra vires whose pith and substance related to 
matters within provincial legislative competence.104 In that case, however, the 
Court found the pith and substance of the impugned law to be the expropriation 
of contractual rights located outside of the Province of Newfoundland, thus 
rendering the enactment ultra vires the province’s powers under section 92(13).105
Following Reference Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, any 
incidental effects under the Model Law outside of the Province of Ontario should 
not undermine its constitutional validity. It remains to be considered, however, 
how a Court would situate the primary territorial effects of the Model Law. 
In Reference Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, the Court found that 
the pith and substance of the law was the expropriation of contractual rights.106 
The court situated these intangible contractual rights by following the general rule 
102. Justice Beetz made a similar statement on the purpose of the federal grant of power 
to regulate bankruptcy and insolvency stating that: “The main purpose was to give to 
Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over the establishment by statute of a particular system 
regulating the distribution of a debtor’s assets.” See Robinson v Countrywide Factors Ltd, 
[1978] 1 SCR 753 at 804-805.
103. See Credit foncier franco-canadien, supra note 89.
104. Reference Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 SCR 297 at 332.
105. Ibid at 335.
106. Ibid.
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under private international law that such rights are situated in the jurisdiction in 
which action may be brought.107 In this case, it had been expressly stated in the 
contract that disputes would be heard in the Province of Quebec.108 Given that 
the object of the law was determined to be the expropriation of contractual rights 
that the Court located outside of the Province of Newfoundland, the law was 
found to be ultra vires Newfoundland’s constitutional jurisdiction over property 
and civil rights in the province.
Following this analysis, the object of a Model Law enacted by the Province 
of Ontario should be found to be territorially situated within the province. The 
debt contracts being regulated by the Model Law would have necessarily selected 
the law of Ontario to govern their contracts. Given that common law courts have 
jurisdiction to hear disputes regarding a contract governed by the law of that 
jurisdiction,109 Reference Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act suggests 
that a province seeking to enact the Model Law will not likely be hindered by the 
territorial limitation contained in section 92(13).110 Furthermore, as suggested 
above, it is common for contracts to include forum selection clauses in favour of 
the jurisdiction whose law governs the contract, and it is possible that many of 
the debt contracts that would be affected by the Model Law would have selected 
the Province of Ontario to hear disputes arising under the contracts. Following 
Reference Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, such clauses could further 
strengthen the argument for the territorial validity of the Model Law. However, 
some commentators have noted that both the identification of a law’s pith and 
substance and the situation of intangible rights can be subject to significant 
discretion.111 For this reason, it is difficult to predict with any degree of certainty 
how these points would be judicially decided in a novel situation.
III. A COMBINED AND COOPERATIVE APPROACH
In our discussion of the constitutional characterization of the Model Law thus far, 
we have suggested that it is likely Ontario could validly enact such a law: As stated, 
our view is that neither the federal grant of power in bankruptcy and insolvency 
nor the territorial limitation contained in section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 
1867 would necessarily defeat a province’s attempt to enact the Model Law.
107. Ibid at 334.
108. Ibid at 306.
109. Janet Walker, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 6th ed (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 
2005) (loose-leaf updated 2018), ch 11, s 11.6.
110. See generally Reference Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, supra note 104.
111. See Ruth E Sullivan, “Interpreting the Territorial Limitations on the Provinces” (1985) 7 
SCLR 511 at 540-43.
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It is readily apparent, however, that the project contemplated by the 
Model Law is unique. Domestic legislation whose primary purpose is to offer 
a restructuring regime to foreign sovereigns surely pushes the boundaries of all 
current precedents in Canadian constitutional law. Enacting the Model Law 
would thus necessarily be breaking new ground in constitutional jurisprudence 
and would correspondingly involve some degree of legal uncertainty.
The underlying objective of the Model Law, however, is to provide greater 
certainty and predictability in sovereign debt markets; a law enacted by the 
Province of Ontario that may be susceptible to constitutional challenge would 
therefore not be useful in serving its fundamental purpose. For this reason, 
despite our view that Ontario arguably has constitutional authority to enact 
the law independently, our strong recommendation is for both the federal 
Parliament and the Ontario legislature to pass complementary legislation 
enacting the Model Law.
The precise nature of this collaboration would depend on the final form that 
the law takes. The Model Law drafted by Professor Steven Schwartz offers an 
excellent template, but will require elaboration prior to enactment, particularly 
in a federation such as Canada in which powers are divided between levels of 
government. For instance, the draft law does not pre-select either the Supervisory 
Authority that will oversee the restructuring process or the body that would arbitrate 
disputes arising under the Model Law. Moreover, as discussed in this section, 
legislative power in Canada for various matters relevant to the Model Law—
such as interest, insolvency, and property and civil rights—is variously assigned 
to the provinces and federal Parliament. While this section has discussed the 
characterization of the Model Law’s pith and substance at a broad level, a definitive 
analysis of the Model Law’s constitutional validity would necessarily depend on 
the exact text of the proposed law. Finally, we note that the federal-provincial 
collaboration may take various forms: The two laws could “mirror” one another 
as exact duplicates—a technique sometimes used to immunize legislation against 
constitutional challenge—or “dove-tail,” with each level of government passing 
those portions of the law within its legislative competence.112 
112. See e.g. Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, SC 1987, 
c 3; Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and 
Labrador Act, RSNL 1990, c C-2 (showing an example of mirror legislation regarding the 
management of petroleum resources in the Gulf of St Lawrence); See generally Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System, “Backgrounder: Agreed Elements of a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System” (19 September 2013) online: <ccmr-ocrmc.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CCMRWebSept19BkgrderAIPPDF.pdf>; “Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System Governance and Legislative Framework” (31 October 
2014) online: <ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/Oct_31-Commentary-English.pdf> 
(showing an example of dove-tailing legislation).
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Our recommendation for a collaborative approach is consistent with the 
principle of cooperative federalism, which has been embraced as the “dominant 
tide” of modern federalism by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Reference Re 
Securities Act, the Court noted that: 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council … tended to favour an exclusive powers 
approach … The Supreme Court of Canada, as final arbiter of Constitutional disputes 
since 1949, moved toward a more flexible view of federalism that accommodates 
overlapping jurisdiction and encourages intergovernmental cooperation—an 
approach that can be described as the “dominant tide” of modern federalism.113
The benefits of federal-provincial cooperation in matters of or surrounding 
insolvency are well-established. When the Bill to enact the first Companies’ 
Creditors Arrangements Act, 1933 was given its second reading in the Senate, 
Senator Meighen remarked that: 
The law now submitted to us could be made vastly more effective if it were not for 
the federal system. As it is, the best result can be obtained only by the passage by our 
legislatures of such co-operative measures as will enable civil rights, and companies 
within their purview, to be interfered with for the general advantage.114
Insolvency—in its general meaning, and not the technical meaning described 
above—has been recognized by the courts as an area in which both federal and 
provincial legislative power can concurrently operate. In Robinson v Countrywide 
Factors, Justice Beetz observed that the risk a debtor may be unable to repay its 
debts underlies those parts of the common law that relate to “mortgage, pledge, 
pawning, suretyship and the securing of debts generally,” but that laws regulating 
such matters do not cease to be laws in relation to property and civil rights.115 
Justice Beetz continued: 
When the exclusive power to make laws in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency 
was bestowed upon Parliament, it was not intended to remove from the general legal 
systems which regulated property and civil rights a cardinal concept essential to the 
coherence of those systems … . However, given the nature of general legal systems, 
the primary jurisdiction of Parliament cannot easily be exercised together with its 
incidental powers without some degree of overlap in which case federal law prevails. 
On the other hand, provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights should not 
be measured by the ultimate reach of federal power over bankruptcy and insolvency.116
113. Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66 at paras 56-57.
114. “Bill 77, an Act to facilitate Compromises and Arrangements between Companies and their 
Creditors,” 2nd reading, Senate Debates, 17th Parl, 4th Sess, Vol 1 (10 May 1933) at 474 
(Hon Arthur Meighen).
115. Robinson v Countrywide Factors, supra note 102 at 804.
116. Ibid at 804-805 [emphasis added].
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As the above quotation suggests, federal and provincial law already closely 
interact in matters of insolvency generally. One may usefully consider the various 
Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs) enacted by Canadian common law 
provinces.117 These statutes require creditors to register any security they hold in 
order to perfect their claim thereon. Creditors who fail to perfect their claim will 
see their rights subordinated to other creditors who registered and perfected their 
interests, and in particular, to the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy. As a result, some 
have argued that PPSAs are ultra vires or are in conflict with federal legislation 
because they alter the rights of certain creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.118
Such an interpretation has yet to be followed by the courts, likely due to the 
nature of PPSAs.119 PPSAs are intra vires provincial legislatures because they make 
reference to, but do not interfere with, bankruptcy trustees while pursuing the 
legitimate provincial legislative goal of governing the rights of secured creditors.120
V. CATALYZING CHANGE: DRAWING LESSONS FROM 
PREVIOUS REFORMS
The Model Law draws upon the reform experience in other areas of law that 
had long been proven intractable. A leading example is the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which became a major success 
due to its informal character and incremental approach to reform. It is worth 
noting that Canada was the first country to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and has played a key role in its development and judicial interpretation. The 
Canadian provinces played an important role and were unanimous in supporting 
its implementation. Today, the UNCITRAL Model Law has been adopted by 
111 jurisdictions.121
117. For instance, Personal Property Security Act, RSO 1990, c P10; Personal Property Security Act, 
SNS 1995-96, c 13; Personal Property Security Act, RSBC 1996, c 359.
118. Arthur Peltomaa, “Constitutional Validity of Provincial Legislation Subordinating 
Unperfected Security Interests to Trustee in Bankruptcy” (1982) 42 CBR (NS) 104.
119. Andrew J Roman & Jasmine Sweatman, “The Conflict Between Provincial Property Security 
Acts and the Federal Bankruptcy Act: The War is Over” (1992) 71 Can Bar Rev 77 at 100.
120. Similarly, the Supreme Court settled the question of the validity of provincial acts regarding 
fraudulent preferences by allowing provincial laws to have effect unless rendered inoperative 
by conflicting federal bankruptcy law. See Robinson v Countrywide Factors, supra note 102. 
This case is discussed further in Hogg, supra note 92, at ch 25 at 8.
121. See “Status UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
amendments as adopted in 2006,” online: <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html> [perma.cc/VT83-8UD6].
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The experience with reform efforts in improving sovereign debt management 
to-date also offers valuable lessons on how to succeed with the Model Law. 
As discussed, in light of the existing political constraints on creating a treaty-based 
regime such as the SDRM, recent reforms to improve sovereign debt restructuring 
have mainly focused on market-based and contractual approaches. A notable 
example of such reforms is provided by the second-generation CACs and the 
new standard pari passu clauses that were introduced by the International Capital 
Market Association following difficulties in resolving claims in Argentina and 
Greece’s debt restructuring due to holdout creditors.122
In spite of limitations that were reviewed previously, the CAC reform process 
offers important lessons for the Model Law initiative. First, it suggests that the 
robust aggregation mechanisms of the Model Law, which also address the pari 
passu issue, are unlikely to affect the bonds’ pricing. As discussed above, the 2014 
Mexican issuance that included the second-generation CACs saw the lowest 
interest rates in Mexican history, and the subsequent uptake of these clauses by 
other issuers also showed no effect on pricing.123 The Model Law can be an even 
more attractive option than CACs 2.0 as it includes provisions on the supervision 
of the restructuring process and the settlement of disputes through arbitration. 
Such provisions provide creditors with greater confidence that their legal rights 
will be reasonably protected in the governing forum and that they will receive a 
fair remedy in case of default or disputes.
Second, the CACs reform highlights the importance of signaling and issuing 
the bonds in good times. That is to say, if a sovereign issuer is in sound financial 
condition and there are no looming questions about its debt sustainability, 
issuing debt under Ontario law should not send any negative signal to markets. 
The final lesson is on the importance of outreach and building alliances to 
overcome collective action problems. The Mexican issuance with the enhanced 
CACs helped policy makers overcome their first mover challenge and provided 
the markets with the essential confidence to take up the enhanced clauses in new 
bonds. Given that Canada is politically stable and has a sound reputation for 
the rule of law and an independent judiciary, it should be possible to convince a 
sovereign borrower with sustainable debt dynamics to issue debt under Ontario 
law. The first issuance will then pave the way for the greater uptake of Ontario 
law in future sovereign debt issuances.
122. See Part III, above, for a discussion of these clauses.
123. Ibid.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The search for a binding sovereign debt restructuring mechanism has been ongoing 
for a very long time. As this article shows, since the 1930s, various attempts have 
been made to establish a statutory restructuring mechanism, the most notable of 
which was the IMF’s SDRM, which has now been abandoned, or left in limbo. 
In the absence of an international restructuring mechanism, collective action 
clauses remain an imperfect attempt to resolve sovereign debt issues. While the 
enhanced CACs are a promising step in the right direction, they are still far from 
a reliable and complete approach to addressing sovereign debt issues.
Although previous attempts aimed at establishing a statutory debt 
restructuring mechanism recognized the inadequacy of the contractual approach, 
they failed to generate sufficient support because they had to rely on concerted 
multilateral action. The Model Law reform initiative can offer the predictability 
and effectiveness of a statutory approach without foundering on the obstacles 
that frustrated previous reforms. Once the Model Law is adopted in one 
jurisdiction, it may be adopted by other national and subnational jurisdictions 
and spread its appeal and application without having to rely on treaties or binding 
international agreements.
Historically, parties to sovereign debt transactions favoured New York and 
England given their well-developed body of commercial law and their judicial 
systems’ impartiality in resolving disputes. However, the recent Argentinian 
saga has casted a shadow over the legitimacy of the New York courts and their 
impartiality resolving sovereign debt disputes. Further, the chaos and uncertainty 
caused by Brexit challenges London’s dominance as a global financial hub. 
Together, these factors create opportunities for other financial centers, such as 
Toronto which are politically stable and can provide the essential impartiality and 
business certainty that sophisticated commercial parties seek in their international 
transactions. Therefore, the time seems ripe for Canada to step up and promote 
its own distinct position in international finance.
As this article argues, the Model Law provides a unique leadership 
opportunity for Ontario, enabling the province to establish an orderly sovereign 
debt resolution regime under the rule of law. Ontario’s neutrality and strong 
reputation for the rule of law and financial stability would support creditors’ 
confidence and reasonable expectations. Particularly, if collaborative legislation is 
pursued with the federal government, there should be no constitutional obstacle to 
the Province of Ontario’s adoption of the Model Law. By its adoption, significant 
benefits would accrue to debtor states and creditors, and Ontario could further 
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develop its capacities as a world-class financial jurisdiction. Both Ontario and the 
deeply dysfunctional sovereign debt world would benefit from the introduction 
and adoption of the Model Law.
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VII. ANNEX: SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING  
MODEL LAW124
PREAMBLE
The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for restructuring 
unsustainable sovereign debt so as to reduce (a) the social costs of sovereign debt 
crises, (b) systemic risk to the financial system, (c) creditor uncertainty, and (d) 
the need for sovereign debt bailouts, which are costly and create moral hazard.
CHAPTER I: SCOPE, AND USE OF TERMS
Article 1: Scope
1. This Law applies where, by contract or otherwise, (a) the law of [this 
jurisdiction] governs [alternative: this Law is specifically stated to govern] 
the debtor-creditor relationship between a State and its creditors and (b) 
the application of this Law is invoked in accordance with Chapter II.
2. [This provision is optional] Where this Law applies, it shall operate 
retroactively and, without limiting the foregoing, shall override any 
contractual provisions that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 2: Use of Terms
For purposes of this Law:
1. “creditor” means a person or entity that has a claim against a State;
2. “claim” means a payment claim against a State for monies borrowed or 
for the State’s guarantee of, or other contingent obligation on, monies 
borrowed; and the term “monies borrowed” shall include the following, 
whether or not it represents the borrowing of money per se: monies 
owing under bonds, debentures, notes, or similar instruments; monies 
owing for the deferred purchase price of property or services, other 
than trade accounts payable arising in the ordinary course of business; 
monies owing on capitalized lease obligations; monies owing on or with 
respect to letters of credit, bankers’ acceptances, or other extensions of 
credit; and monies owing on money-market instruments or instruments 
used to finance trade;
3. “Plan” means a debt restructuring plan contemplated by Chapter III;
124. See Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law, supra note 67 (incorporated here with Professor 
Schwarcz’s permission).
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4. “State” means a sovereign nation;
5. “Supervisory Authority” means [name of neutral 
international organization].
CHAPTER II: INVOKING THE LAW’S APPLICATION
Article 3: Petition for Relief, and Recognition
1. A State may invoke application of this Law by filing a voluntary petition 
for relief with the Supervisory Authority. 
2. Such petition shall certify that the State (a) seeks relief under this Law, 
and has not previously sought relief under this Law (or under any other 
law that is substantially in the form of this Law) during the past [ten] 
years, (b) needs relief under this Law to restructure claims that, absent 
such relief, would constitute unsustainable debt of the State, (c) agrees 
to restructure those claims in accordance with this Law, (d) agrees to 
all other terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law, and (e) has 
duly enacted any national law needed to effectuate these agreements. 
If requested by the Supervisory Authority, such petition shall also attach 
documents and legal opinions evidencing compliance with clause (e).
3. Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, and so long as 
such filing has not been dismissed by the Supervisory Authority [or this 
jurisdiction] for lack of good faith, the terms, conditions, and provisions 
of this Law shall (a) apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between 
the State and its creditors to the extent such relationship is governed 
by the law of [this jurisdiction]; (b) apply to the debtor-creditor 
relationship between the State and its creditors to the extent such 
relationship is governed by the law of another jurisdiction that has 
enacted law substantially in the form of this Law; and (c) be recognized 
in, and by, all other jurisdictions that have enacted law substantially in 
the form of this Law.
Article 4: Notification of Creditors
1. Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the State shall notify all 
of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a Plan under this Law. 
2. The Supervisory Authority shall prepare and maintain a current list 
of creditors of the State and verify claims for purposes of supervising 
voting under this Law.
PEIHANI, JEWETT,  A ROLE FOR CANADA? 433
CHAPTER III: VOTING ON A DEBT RESTRUCTURING PLAN
Article 5: Submission of Plan
1. The State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time, and may submit 
alternative Plans from time to time.
2. No other person or entity may submit a Plan.
Article 6: Contents of Plan
A Plan shall
1. designate classes of claims in accordance with Article 7(3);
2. specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims; 
3. provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular class, unless 
the holder of a claim agrees to a less favorable treatment;
4. disclose any claims not included in the Plan’s classes of claims; 
5. provide adequate means for the Plan’s implementation including, 
with respect to any claims, curing or waiving any defaults or changing 
the maturity dates, principal amount, interest rate, or other terms or 
cancelling or modifying any liens or encumbrances; and
6. certify that, if the Plan becomes effective and binding on the State and 
its creditors under Article 7(1), the State’s debt will become sustainable. 
Article 7: Voting on the Plan
1. A Plan shall become effective and binding on the State and its creditors 
when it has been submitted by the State and agreed to by each class 
of such creditors’ claims designated in the Plan under Article 6(1). 
Thereupon, the State shall be discharged from all claims included in 
those classes of claims, except as provided in the Plan.
2. A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least 
[two-thirds] in amount and more than [one-half ] in number of the 
claims of such class [voting on such Plan] [entitled to vote on such 
Plan] agree to the Plan.
3. Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the State that are pari 
passu in priority, provided that (a) pari passu claims need not all be included 
in the same class, (b) claims of governmental or multi-governmental 
entities each shall be classed separately, and (c) claims that are governed 
by this Law or the law of another jurisdiction that is substantially in the 
form of this Law shall not be classed with other claims. 
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I. CHAPTER IV: FINANCING THE RESTRUCTURING
Article 8: Terms of Lending
1. Subject to Article 8(3), the State shall have the right to borrow money 
on such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate.
2. The State shall notify all of its known creditors of its intention to borrow 
under Article 8(1), the terms and conditions of the borrowing, and the 
proposed use of the loan proceeds. Such notice shall also direct those 
creditors to respond to the Supervisory Authority within 30 days as to 
whether they approve or disapprove of such loan. 
3. Any such loan must be approved by creditors holding at least two-thirds 
in amount of the claims of creditors responding to the Supervisory 
Authority within that 30-day period. 
4. In order for the priority of repayment (and corresponding subordination) 
under Article 9 to be effective, any such loan must additionally be 
approved by creditors holding at least two-thirds in principal amount 
of the “covered” claims of creditors responding to the Supervisory 
Authority within that 30-day period. Claims shall be deemed to be 
“covered” if they are governed by this Law or by the law of another 
jurisdiction that is substantially in the form of this Law. 
Article 9: Priority of Repayment
1. The State shall repay loans approved under Article 8 prior to paying 
any other claims. 
2. The claims of creditors of the State are subordinated to the extent needed 
to effectuate the priority payment under this Article 9. Such claims are 
not subordinated for any other purpose.
3. The priority of repayment (and corresponding subordination) 
under this Article 9 is expressly subject to the approval by creditors 
under Article 8(4). 
CHAPTER V: ADJUDICATION OF DISPUTES
Article 10: Arbitration
1. All disputes arising under this Law shall be resolved by binding 
arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators. 
2. The arbitration shall be governed by [generally accepted international 
arbitration rules of (name of neutral international arbitration body)] 
[the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes/ International Centre for Dispute Resolution/ International 
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Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration/ specify 
other international arbitration organization].
3. Notwithstanding Article 10(2), if all the parties to an arbitration 
contractually agree that such arbitration shall be governed by other 
rules, it shall be so governed. Such agreement may be made before or 
after the dispute arises.
4. The State shall pay all costs, fees, and expenses of the arbitrations.
CHAPTER VI: OPT IN
Article 11: Opting in to this Law
1. Any creditors of the State whose claims are not otherwise governed 
by this Law may contractually opt in to this Law’s terms, conditions, 
and provisions. 
2. The terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law shall apply to the 
debtor-creditor relationship between the State and creditors opting in 
under Article 11(1) as if such relationship were governed by the law of 
[this jurisdiction] under Article 3(3).
